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The consequences of the theorems about ontological models are studied. Maximally ψ-epistemic
is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of two other conditions, each of which can be realized
in Hilbert spaces of arbitrary dimension, but which cannot occur together for d > 2. I argue
that current theorems do not invalidate an epistemic interpretation of quantum states. A new
condition, called functionally ψ-epistemic, is introduced, which, were it to be excluded, would signal
the exclusion of epistemic interpretations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Debates over the status of the quantum state concept
have been ongoing since the beginning of the theory.
Is the state ψ a physically real object (ontic interpret-
ation), or is it an abstract entity that merely provides
information about the system (epistemic interpretation)?
The introduction of ontological models by Harrigan and
Spekkens [1] created a framework whereby the discus-
sion could be made much more precise. Now the argu-
ments are based on mathematically proven theorems, in
addition to philosophical arguments. But the growing
number of theorems, combined with some peculiar term-
inology, has led to confusion. We read of maximally
ψ-epistemic models [2][3], and maximally nontrivial ψ-
epistemic models [4]. The two terms are not synonymous;
moreover, the authors of the first prove the nonexistence
of that class of models, whereas the authors of the sec-
ond provide constructive examples of their class. Several
other classes of ontological models have been discussed,
many of which have constructive (though often artificial)
examples. If this was not already complicated enough,
it has been claimed to prove [7] that the only mathe-
matically consistent interpretation is that the wave func-
tion of a system be in one-to-one correspondence with
its elements of reality. Yet the observational inadequacy
of that interpretation was already well known to Ein-
stein and Schro¨dinger in 1935, since in that interpreta-
tion, Schro¨dinger’s cat would have neither the property
of being live nor being dead. Taken together, all of these
claims seem to indicate that no satisfactory interpreta-
tion of quantum theory is even possible!
“A good joke should not be repeated too often,” as
Einstein said to Heisenberg. In this paper I shall try
to overcome the confusion that may come from a casual
reading of the recent literature, with its apparently con-
flicting claims. I shall limit myself to ontological models
of single component systems, and so will not treat Bell’s
theorem, nonlocality, or entanglement. Those topics have
their own extensive literature, and including them would
make for much too long a paper.
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II. ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
In an ontological model, we posit a space Λ of ontic
states, which underlie or supplement the quantum state
ψ. The two primary quantum-mechanical concepts of
state preparation and measurement are each represented
in an ontological model. A preparation SP of the
quantum state ψ actually yields some ontic state λ ∈ Λ.
A repetition of the same SP may yield a different λ, and
the probability distribution of the resulting ontic states,
µ(λ|ψ, SP ), is called the epistemic state associated with
ψ. It satisfies
∫
Λ
µ(λ|ψ, SP )dλ = 1 . (1)
The possible outcomes of a measurement of the observ-
able M may be labeled by its eigenvalues, or (as is more
convenient here) by its eigenvectors {φk}. The probabil-
ity of obtaining the k’th outcome is given by the response
function, ξ(φk|λ, SM ), where SM denotes the particular
measurement method used. If ξ takes on only the values
0 or 1, the model is called outcome-deterministic. If ξ
may take on values between 0 and 1, the model is called
outcome-indeterministic.
There may be more than one preparation method, SP ,
that yields the same quantum state. If the epistemic
state µ(λ|ψ, SP ) depends nontrivially on SP for the same
ψ, the model is called preparation contextual. Similarly,
there may be more than one way to measureM . If the re-
sponse function ξ(φk|λ, SM ) depends nontrivially on the
method SM , the model is called measurement contextual.
When contextuality is not relevant, the notations SP and
SM may be omitted for brevity.
The model is required to reproduce the quantum statis-
tics for measurement outcomes. Without serious loss of
generality, we may consider only a projective observable,
M = |φ〉〈φ|. Then if the quantum state ψ is prepared,
the probability of a positive outcome of the measurement
will be ∫
Λ
ξ(φ|λ, SM )µ(λ|ψ, SP ) dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|
2 . (2)
Quantum mechanics has an interesting reciprocal
relation between state preparation and measurement.
Quantum Certainty: A system that is prepared in
2FIG. 1: Core support Core(ξ(ψ|λ)), and total support
Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)).
the state ψ will always pass the test of measuring the
projector |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Converse: The state ψ is the only state that will pass
the projective measurement filter |ψ〉〈ψ| with certainty.
Since both Quantum Certainty and its converse hold
in quantum mechanics, there is a relationship of
preparation–measurement reciprocity, which will be
called reciprocity, for short.
An ontological model must satisfy Quantum Cer-
tainty, otherwise it would not agree with a prediction
of quantum mechanics. Hence we must require
∫
Λ
ξ(ψ|λ, SM )µ(λ|ψ, SP ) dλ = 1 . (3)
The supports, in the ontic state space Λ, of the two func-
tions in the integrand above, are of considerable interest.
Define Λψ = Supp(µ(λ|ψ)) as the subset of Λ for which
µ(λ|ψ) > 0. Similarly, Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)) is the subset of
Λ within which ξ(ψ|λ) is nonzero. We also define the
core support of the response function, Core(ξ(ψ|λ)), as
the subset of Λ within which ξ(ψ|λ) = 1. The relation
between Core and Supp is illustrated in Figure 1.
Notice that the range of integration in (3) may be
reduced from Λ to the subset Λψ, since only there is the
integrand nonzero. But since µ(λ|ψ) is non-negative and
satisfies (1), the requirement (3) can be satisfied only if
ξ(ψ|λ) = 1 for all λ inside Λψ. Hence we conclude that
Λψ ⊆ Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) ⊆ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)) (4)
This relation is very useful in clarifying several prop-
erties of ontological models. The first inclusion ensures
that any ontic state that may be produced by a prepar-
ation of ψ will also pass the projective filter |ψ〉〈ψ|, so
the model satisfies Quantum Certainty. But the converse
need not hold. It is possible for the set of ontic states that
pass the filter |ψ〉〈ψ| with certainty to be larger than the
set Λψ that can be prepared with the quantum state ψ.
Thus reciprocity does not hold for all ontic models. The
condition for reciprocity is
Λψ = Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) . (5)
An outcome-deterministic model satisfies
Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) = Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)) , (6)
whereas an outcome-indeterministic model satisfies
Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) ⊂ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)) . (7)
The inelegant term deficiency has been used [5] for the
relation Λψ ⊂ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)). It is apparent from (4) that
deficiency may alternatively be defined as
Deficiency = nonreciprocity OR outcome-indeterminacy
(8)
III. ψ-EPISTEMIC MODELS, MAXIMAL AND
OTHERWISE
Harrigan and Spekkens [1] define two principal classes
of ontological models: ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic. Intu-
itively speaking, ψ-ontic means that the quantum state
ψ is an element of physical reality, whereas ψ-epistemic
means that ψ is an abstract entity that provides infor-
mation about the system.
These intuitive notions are supplemented by a more
precise mathematical definition. A model is considered
to be ψ-ontic if the specification of the ontic state λ
uniquely determines the quantum state ψ. For this to
be true, it is necessary that the preparations of any
pair of different quantum states, ψ and φ, should yield
ontic state distributions whose supports, Λψ and Λφ,
do not overlap. Two subclasses are identified. In a ψ-
complete model, ψ is the only ontic state variable. In a
ψ-supplemented model, there are some other ontic vari-
ables in addition to ψ. (One could identify a third class,
in which specifying the ontic variable(s) λ, excluding ψ,
enables ψ to be uniquely calculated. But since no such
models have yet been constructed, the point is moot.)
Although the class ψ-ontic was carefully defined, the
class ψ-epistemic was merely defined as the complement
of ψ-ontic. This allows trivial ψ-epistemic models, such
as ones for which there is only a single pair of states,
ψ and φ, for which Λψ and Λφ overlap. However, there
are nontrivial ψ-epistemic models. Indeed, Aaronson et
al. [4] have shown that there are maximally-nontrivial
ψ-epistemic models, for which the supports Λψ and Λφ
overlap for every non-orthogonal pair, ψ and φ. These
models can be constructed for any finite dimension of the
Hilbert space.
Following this line, the most ambitious goal would be
to construct maximally-epistemic models, for which the
overlap probability of any two state vectors, |〈φ|ψ〉|2, is
fully accounted for by the overlap of the corresponding
distributions, µ(λ|φ) and µ(λ|ψ). A way to implement
this condition would be to require that all of the contri-
butions to the integral on the left side of (2) should come
from the overlap region Λφ∩Λψ. We have the elementary
3relations∫
Λφ
µ(λ|ψ) dλ =
∫
Λφ
ξ(φ|λ)µ(λ|ψ) dλ
≤
∫
Λ
ξ(φ|λ)µ(λ|ψ) dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|2. (9)
(Note: The first line uses Λφ ⊆ Core(ξ(φ|λ)) from
(4), and the integrals are effectively over Λφ ∩ Λψ.) A
maximally-epistemic model is defined to satisfy the above
relations with the inequality replaced by an equality. If
we write ∫
Λφ
µ(λ|ψ) dλ = f(φ, ψ) |〈φ|ψ〉|2, (10)
where 0 ≤ f(φ, ψ) ≤ 1, then the condition for a model to
be maximally-epistemic is f(φ, ψ) = 1 for all φ and ψ.
The Kochen-Specker model for a spin- 1
2
system is a
nice example of a maximally ψ-epistemic model. (The
original K-S paper predates the framework of ontological
models, but both [1] and [5] give concise descriptions
of the K-S model within this framework.) However,
Maroney [2] has demonstrated that in Hilbert spaces of 3
or more dimensions, it is impossible to have f(φ, ψ) = 1
for all vectors. If f is taken to be a constant, he obtains
the bound f ≤ 9
10
for 3 dimensions. Much tighter
bounds have been obtained for higher Hilbert-space
dimensions [2][6]. Therefore, maximally ψ-epistemic
models do not exist for more than 2 dimensions.
Maroney’s theorem [2] is surprising, and we should try
to better understand its significance. To reproduce the
statistical predictions of QM, any model must satisfy
∫
Λ
ξ(φ|λ)µ(λ|ψ) dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|2. (11)
A maximally ψ-epistemic model must also satisfy
∫
Λφ
µ(λ|ψ) dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|2. (12)
These equations must both hold for all choices of |ψ〉.
We may assume that any λ ∈ Λ can be reached by a
preparation of some |ψ〉 (else the unpreparable values of
λ would be superfluous, and could be discarded from the
model). Therefore, it is necessary that ξ(φ|λ) = 1 for
λ ∈ Λφ , and that ξ(φ|λ) = 0 for λ outside of Λφ. Hence
Λφ = Core(ξ(φ|λ)) = Supp(ξ(φ|λ)) . (13)
This equation says that a maximally ψ-epistemic model
must satisfy reciprocity and outcome-determinacy.
Because it will be useful in the next section, I state a
Corollary of (13):
Maximally ψ-epistemic⇒ Measurement noncontextual.
Suppose that ξ(φ|λ, SM ) were to depend nontrivially on
the measurement procedure SM . We have already shown
that ξ(φ|λ) = 1 for λ ∈ Λφ , and is zero elsewhere. Since
Λφ is fixed by the state preparation, it cannot depend
on SM , so there is no way that ξ(φ|λ, SM ) can acquire
dependence on SM . Thus ξ(φ|λ) is actually noncontex-
tual.
Returning to the main argument, the converse of (13)
is also true. This can be seen by following the steps back-
wards to (11). Therefore, we have a new characterization
of maximally ψ-epistemic models:
Maximally ψ-epistemic⇐⇒ Reciprocity
AND Outcome-determinacy (14)
It follows from this implication that any ontological
model (ψ-ontic included) can fail to be maximally ψ-
epistemic in only two ways. It can be outcome-
indeterminate, or it can fail to be reciprocal (the lat-
ter implying that the converse of Quantum Certainty
does not hold for the model). In view of Maroney’s
theorem, every ontological model (except for those that
treat only 2-d Hilbert spaces) must be either outcome-
indeterminate or nonreciprocal.
In view of the failure of the attempt to explain the
indistinguishability of non-orthogonal quantum states
by the overlap of the corresponding ontic state proba-
bility distributions, we should ask how it is explained
within the above two options. If the model is outcome-
indeterminate then the explanation is qualitatively the
same as for ordinary QM without any deeper layer of
ontic states. It is not the case that non-orthogonal
quantum states cannot be distinguished — it is only that
they cannot be distinguished with certainty. It is a stan-
dard problem of quantum information theory to devise an
optimal measurement for distinguishing non-orthogonal
states. As the two states approach orthogonality, the
success rate approaches 100%, and as they approach par-
allelism the success rate approaches that of pure chance
(50%). But in all cases, the optimal strategy is better
than pure chance. If the ontic states of the model are
accessible, then the predictive power of the model may
be greater than that of pure QM. But there will be no
qualitative difference.
The next case appears to be quite different. In the
previous case (outcome-indeterminate) we have
Λφ = Core(ξ(φ|λ)) ⊂ Supp(ξ(φ|λ)) , (15)
while in this case (nonreciprocal), we have
Λφ ⊂ Core(ξ(φ|λ)) = Supp(ξ(φ|λ)) . (16)
Yet there is a similarity, in that both cases obey
Λφ ⊂ Supp(ξ(φ|λ)) . (17)
This property that has been burdened [5] with the un-
descriptive name deficiency. But since non-deficiency is
equivalent to maximally ψ-epistemic, perhaps the ugly
word deficiency can be laid to rest. Far from being
a defect of ontological models, it is actually an aspect
4of quantum normality. Example 1 in App. A (the
Beltrametti-Bugajski model) is essentially ordinary QM,
without any additional ontic structures, and it exhibits
property (17).
This section began with a discovery — the impossi-
bility of maximally ψ-epistemic models in dimensions
greater than 2 — that appeared to pose a serious threat
to epistemic interpretations of quantum states. It has
concluded by showing that the impossibility of such
models is equivalent to two structural features that affect
all ontological models, both ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic. So,
thus far, both epistemic and ontic interpretations remain
viable.
IV. CONTEXTUALITY
The various concepts of contextuality have been stud-
ied in detail by Harrigan and Rudolph [5] and by Leifer
and Maroney [3]. The latter paper contains the theorem:
Preparation noncontextual⇒ Maximally ψ-epistemic
⇒ K-S noncontextual (18)
Both implications are strictly one-directional. I shall dis-
cuss separately the significance of the two parts of this
theorem (for proofs, see [3]).
A. Preparation Contextuality
Let µ(λ|ρ, SP ) be the probability of obtaining the
ontic state λ from a preparation of the (pure or mixed)
quantum state ρ by the method SP . If this probability
depends nontrivially on the preparation method SP for
the same quantum state ρ, this situation is called prep-
aration contextuality. Although this concept could, in
principle, be applied to pure states, in practice, it has
only been used for states that are (literally) mixtures.
It is well known that a mixed state operator can be
represented as convex sum of pure components in many
ways. For example, the unpolarized state of an ensemble
of spin- 1
2
particles can be obtained from the following two
mixtures:
ρ0 =
1
2
(| ↑〉〈↑ |+ | ↓〉〈↓ |) (19)
ρ0 =
1
2
(| ←〉〈← |+ | →〉〈→ |) (20)
The first equation describes a mixture of eigenstates of
spin σz (up and down), while the second describes a mix-
ture of eigenstates of spin σx (left and right). The state
operator ρ0 is the same in both cases. But are the distri-
butions of ontic states {λ} the same in both cases? For
the Kochen-Specker model (Ex. 2 in App. A), they are
not. The state operator ρ0 has spherical symmetry, but
in the first case, the ontic state distribution has cylindri-
cal symmetry about the z-axis, while in the second case
it has cylindrical symmetry about the x-axis.
As was shown in the previous section, maximal ψ-
epistemic fails in most cases, therefore, from (18), prep-
aration noncontextuality must also fail in those cases. In
other words, the ontic state distribution µ(λ|ρ, SP ) typi-
cally depends, not only on the quantum state ρ, but also
on the particular mixture used to prepare it.
Should this fact be of concern to the supporters of any
particular interpretation of QM? I think not. It is quite
common, in both classical and quantum physics, for a
higher level theory to be more symmetric than the lower
level theory that underlies it. Consider the continuum
theory of electrical conductivity, which is described by
the conductivity tensor σµν . Beneath it lies the atomic
theory, in which electrons flow through a crystal lattice.
The crystal lattice is never isotropic, but if it possesses
4-fold symmetry, then it is easy to show that this implies
an isotropic conductivity tensor, σµν = σ0δµν . This sit-
uation – that the higher level theory is more symmetric
than the lower level theory beneath it – is typical. It is
not at all surprising that a similar relation should hold
between quantum theory and the ontological models.
B. Kochen-Specker Theorem
The theorem of Kochen and Specker [9] addresses the
question:
Is it possible that, at any instant of time, the
QM observables each possess a definite value
(equal to one of its eigenvalues), regardless of
whether they have been measured?
The system that they consider is quite realistic: a parti-
cle of spin 1, and its dynamical variables S 2x , S
2
y and S
2
z .
Each of the operators has eigenvalues 0 (nondegenerate)
and 1 (doubly degenerate). These 3 operators are com-
mutative, and their sum is S 2x +S
2
y +S
2
z = 2. Therefore,
in any of their common eigenstates, two of them must
have the value 1 and one must have the value 0. For
technical reasons, it is convenient to replace these ob-
servables by projection operators: Mx = 1 − S
2
x , and
similarly for any other vector directions in space. For
any orthogonal triad of directions (x,y,z), the projection
operators satisfy Mx +My +Mz = 1.
The KS problem is to construct a valuation on the set
{Mi}, which must satisfy the following conditions.
(i) For each vector direction, the value is either 0 or 1.
(ii) For any orthogonal triad of vectors, exactly one of
them has the value 1.
(iii) No two orthogonal vectors can both receive the
value 1.
Difficulties arise because a vector can belong to more
than one triad. By a heroic effort, Kochen and Specker
were able to construct a graph of 117 vectors, for which
they proved that no such valuation is possible!
Remark 1: The KS theorem is the impossibility of
the valuation described above. There is no mention of
5measurement, and in view of the question posed at the
beginning, there should be none.
There is more than one possible interpretation as to
the physical reason behind the KS theorem.
(PI 1) The set of observables used in the KS theorem
do not have predetermined values. Rather, the values
emerge as a consequence of the interaction between the
system and the measurement apparatus.
(PI 2) The outcomes of the measurements are con-
textual. For example, a measurement of the commuting
triple (Mx,My,Mz) is one possible context for measure-
ment of Mx. A measurement of (Mx,My′ ,Mz′) is an-
other context. Here (y′, z′) are obtained from (y, z) by
rotation about the x-axis. If the measurements are con-
textual, the values obtained for Mx may be different in
these two contexts.
Abbott et al. [10] show that propositions PI 1 and
PI 2 are not equivalent. Each is sufficient to “explain”
the KS theorem, but neither is necessary. Note that the
KS theorem does not say that every observable must be
value indefinite or contextual, but only that it is impos-
sible for the entire set of observables to be value definite
and noncontextual. Abbott et al. show that, for any
chosen set of observables, it is possible for at least one
to be value definite. An interesting goal of their paper
is to identify observables that are provably value indef-
inite, which could then be used as certifiable quantum
random-number generators.
Remark 2: The KS theorem applies at the level of QM
observables. Its extension to the level of ontic states is
not automatic.
However, the extension is not difficult. Suppose
that the response function for the measurement of Mi,
ξ(Mi|λ), is outcome deterministic. Then, for each ontic
state λ, it will provide a valuation of the observables
{Mi} of the kind contemplated in the K-S theorem. But
for Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 (or higher), no such
valuation is possible. As a consequence of this fact,
there are two possibilities. The first is that the response
function be outcome indeterministic. It then yields only
a probability for the measurement outcome, and so does
not yield a (self-contradictory) valuation on the set of
observables. The second is that the response function be
measurement contextual. This means that ξ(Mi|λ, SM )
depends on the measurement context SM , as well as on
the particular observable Mi that is being measured.
This result is worth stating as a theorem, which I shall
call the “KS-OM Theorem” (KS theorem extended to
Ontological Models):
KS–OM Theorem: For a quantum system of
Hilbert-space dimension 3 or greater, any underlying
ontological model must be outcome indeterministic OR
measurement contextual.
Notice that these two options for ontological models
closely parallel the two options at the QM observable
level, PI 1 and PI 2, that were paraphrased from [10].
But the necessary arguments in [10] were very subtle and
complex, whereas the derivation of the KS-OM theorem
was very simple. This confirms, once again, the utility
of the ontological model as a method of investigation.
Let us now return to the second implication of the
theorem (18), which by logical contraposition becomes
K-S contextual⇒ NOT Maximally ψ-epistemic.
The authors did not distinguish between the KS theorem
and the KS-OM theorem (naturally enough, since the lat-
ter had not yet been formalized), and so the exact mean-
ing of their implication above is not quite clear. Their
definition of “the Kochen-Specker theorem” in [3] does
not reflect the conditions of the original KS theorem;
however, it is very close to those of the KS-OM theorem.
From its context, their term “K-S contextual” seems to
mean the second option of the KS-OM theorem. How-
ever, a stronger statement is possible.
Both options of the KS-OM theorem imply that Max-
imally ψ-epistemic models are excluded.
From (14), it is evident that the first option, outcome
indeterminacy, excludes Maximally ψ-epistemic models.
Immediately following (13) was stated a Corollary, to the
effect that a Maximally ψ-epistemic model must be mea-
surement noncontextual. So the second option of the
KS-OM theorem also excludes Maximally ψ-epistemic
models.
This was actually proven in [3] (their Theorem 1 ), and
any confusion is due only to the ambiguity of the term
“KS contextual”.
V. Ψ-ONTIC-COMPLETE
Colbeck and Renner [7] have presented a theorem, from
which they conclude that “A system’s wave function is in
one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality.”
Their argument is based on the conclusion of an earlier
paper [8], in which they claimed that “No extension of
quantum theory can have improved predictive power.” In
the context of ontological models, their claims are equiv-
alent to excluding all models except ψ-ontic-complete.
The audacity of their claims invites skepticism. Al-
though their papers are heavily formal, the authors are
very helpful in pointing out that their conclusions depend
on a certain assumption relating to Freedom of Choice.
They point out that several counter-examples to their
claims violate that assumption.
Colbeck and Renner represent free choice as a random
variable that is uncorrelated with anything in its past
light-cone. The unsatisfactory nature of that character-
ization is apparent. For example, democratic elections
are based on the secret ballot, the purpose of which is to
ensure that the voters may excersize free choice. The vot-
ing patterns of most voters are strongly correlated with
past events. Many people vote consistently for the same
party, but they may depart from that pattern for any of
several reasons: recent performance of their old party in
6government, personal characteristics of particular can-
didates, self-interest, etc. But those correlations with
events in the past light-cone notwithstanding, they are
still excersizing free choice!
The characterization of free choice that Colbeck and
Renner use is unrealistic and unsatisfactory. Since, by
their own admission, their results depend critically on
that assumption, it follows that their radical claims are
null and void.
Ghirardi and Romano [11], in opposition to the claim
of [8], have shown how to construct an ontological model
whose predictive power is different, and possibly greater,
than that of quantum theory. The essence of their model
is to separate the ontic state λ into two parts (ν, τ), where
ν is inaccessible and must be averaged over, but τ is ac-
cessible. Let Aˆ(a) denote a quantum mechanical observ-
able that depends on the parameter a. (A component of
spin, Aˆ(a) = ~σ · ~a, is an example.) The average of this
observable can be calculated in two steps. First average
over the inaccessible ontic variable ν, to obtain the condi-
tional average, 〈Aˆ(a)〉ψ,τ . Then average over the accessi-
ble variable τ to obtain the usual quantum state average,
〈Aˆ(a)〉ψ = 〈ψ|Aˆ(a)|ψ〉. The model can be constructed so
that the conditional average 〈Aˆ(a)〉ψ,τ is more informa-
tive than is the quantum state average.
Many thought experiments (such as that in Bell’s
theorem) treat the selection of the observable to be mea-
sured as a free choice by the experimenter. In [11] free
choice is represented by allowing the parameter a in Aˆ(a)
to be arbitrary, and then proving the desired results for
all values of a. Thus the manner in which the exper-
imenter chooses a is irrelevant. This method is more
satisfactory than to speculate about the random or non-
random nature of free will [12].
The interpretation of QM in which “A system’s
wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its
elements of reality” has been criticized, and usually re-
jected, because of Schro¨dinger’s Cat Paradox (1935). It
follows from that interpretation, that the cat possesses
neither the attribute of being alive nor the attribute of
being dead. If that conclusion is rejected on observational
grounds, then the ontological model ψ-complete will not
lead to a satisfactory interpretation of quantum theory.
However, ψ-epistemic models and ψ-ontic-supplemented
models remain as viable candidates. In all of those
models, the cat may be either alive or dead, but the
quantum state does not provide us with the information
as to which is the case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The broadest consequence of introducing ontological
models into the foundations of QM, is a sharpening of
the discussions. A woefully common feature, in the past,
was that each protagonist had some interpretation of the
quantum state in mind, but never stated clearly what
it was, and so might shift between ontic and epistemic
interpretations whenever he found it convenient. The
introduction of ontological models has made people aware
of the distinction between ontic and epistemic.
But beyond this raising of awareness, it has provided
a mathematical framework, within which various possi-
bilities can be evaluated. Ontic and epistemic models
were distinguished by the overlap of the epistemic states
(distributions of ontic states) that are associated with
the preparations of different quantum states. This over-
lap varies from zero for ψ-ontic models, through various
degrees of overlap for ψ-epistemic models, to the limit of
maximally ψ-epistemic.
It came as a surprize when Maroney’s theorem [2]
demonstrated that maximally ψ-epistemic models are
not possible for Hilbert spaces of more than 2 dimensions.
Indeed, some people concluded (prematurely) that epis-
temic interpretations of quantum states had been ruled
out. However, it was shown earlier in this paper that
maximally ψ-epistemic is logically equivalent to the con-
junction of preparation-measurement-reciprocity AND
outcome-determinism. Thus any model (ψ-epistemic
or ψ-ontic) can fail to be maximally ψ-epistemic in
only two ways: either through nonreciprocity or by
indeterminism. It had been hoped that the inability
to distinguish non-orthogonal quantum states with
certainty might be explained through the overlap of the
corresponding ontic state distributions. That proved
to be impossible, but measurement-outcome indeter-
minism can also account for non-distinguishability of
non-orthogonal quantum states, and this works for both
ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic models.
An ontological model has two essential parts: the dis-
tribution µ(λ|ψ, SP ) that characterizes quantum state
preparation, and the response function ξ(Mi|λ, SM ) that
characterizes measurement. The most important struc-
ture of the model is the separation of preparation from
measurement, with information passing only via the ontic
state variables. If the state ψ has a direct effect on the
measurement outcome, then ψ should be classified as an
ontic variable. The definition in [1] of ψ-ontic and ψ-
epistemic in terms of the overlap between the distribu-
tions of ontic states, deals only with preparation, and does
not deal with the passing of information to the measure-
ment. Therefore, I shall introduce a new definition for
this purpose.
Define a model to be functionally ψ-epistemic if the
measurement response function ξ(Mi|λ, SM ) does not
depend on the state ψ. Otherwise, if the response func-
tion ξ(Mi|ψ, λ, SM ) depends essentially on ψ, the model
is functionally ψ-ontic.
The Kochen-Specker model (Ex. 2 in App. A) is an
example of a functionally ψ-epistemic model, but it is
restricted to Hilbert spaces of 2 dimensions.
Under the old definition in [1], we could convert a ψ-
epistemic model into a ψ-ontic-supplemented model by
declaring – verbally – that ψ is to be considered ontic.
That would be quite artificial, but it is allowed by that
7definition. The new definition of functionally ψ-epistemic
does not allow such a loophole.
I claim that the essential feature of an epistemic inter-
pretation of quantum states is better captured by the
concept of functionally ψ-epistemic than by the definition
of ψ-epistemic in [1]. The nonexistence of maximally ψ-
epistemic models (for d ≥ 3) does not rule out epistemic
interpretations. However, if functionally ψ-epistemic
models should turn out to be excluded, then epistemic
interpretations would, indeed, be excluded with them.
Appendix A – Some Ontological Models
Some examples of Ontological Models are described
in Table I. The last 3 columns indicate whether the
model has the attributes of Preparation-measurement-
reciprocity, Outcome-determinism, and Measurement-
contextuality. Recall that all models satisfy (Eq. 4),
Λψ ⊆ Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) ⊆ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)), and that
Reciprocity means Λψ = Core(ξ(ψ|λ)), and
Determinism means Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) = Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)).
TABLE I: Examples of Ontological Models
Name Type Reciprocity Determinism Contextual
1 B–B ontic-
complete
yes no no
2 K–S epistemic
(d=2)
yes yes no
3 Aaronson ontic-
supplem.
yes no yes
4 Bell 1st ontic-
supplem.
no yes yes
5 Bell 2nd ontic-
supplem.
(d=2)
no yes no
6 Aerts ontic-
complete
(d=2)
yes no no
7 W–S ontic-
supplem.
no yes yes
Notice that, of the properties in the last 3 columns,
not all combinations of yes and no are represented.
Since reciprocity AND determinism imply that the model
is maximally ψ-epistemic (14), and the Corollary of
(13) requires maximally ψ-epistemic to be measurement-
noncontextual, it follows that the combination yes–yes–
yes is impossible. It remains to be determined whether
models exhibiting no–no–yes and no–no–no are possi-
ble. It would be particularly interesting to exhibit a
measurement-noncontextual model for d > 2, since the
KS-OM theorem seems to permit it, provided the model
is outcome indeterministic.
Models 1–6 in Table I are discussed in detail in [5], and
in those cases where I have nothing to add, I shall merely
refer to that paper. For original references, see [5].
1. Beltrametti-Bugajski model: This model is really
just ordinary QM, written in the language of ontological
models. The ontic state space Λ is the projective Hilbert
space of quantum states, and µ(λ|ψ) dλ = δ(λ − ψ) dλ.
The response function for a projective measurement of
|ψ〉〈ψ| is ξ(ψ|λ) = |〈λ|ψ〉|2. The core-support of ξ(ψ|λ)
is the single point λ = ψ, whereas its full support consists
of Λ minus the set of measure zero for which 〈λ|ψ〉 = 0.
Thus the model satisfies
Λψ = Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) ⊂ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)), showing that it sat-
isfies preparation-measurement-reciprocity, but is “defi-
cient.”
2. Kochen-Specker model: See [5] for details. The
K-S model for a spin- 1
2
system exhibits everything
that is “nice” in ontological models: reciprocity, max-
imally ψ-epistemic, functionally ψ-epistemic, outcome-
deterministic, and measurement-noncontextual. It also
provides a simple example of preparation-contextuality.
Unfortunately, there are fundamental reasons why this
combination of nice features cannot all be realized for
higher dimensional Hilbert spaces.
3. Aaronson’s model: See [5] for details. This model
is similar to Model 1, but it adds a privileged basis,
and so becomes ψ-supplemented. It was invented for
computation-theoretic purposes.
4. Bell’s first model: See [5] for details.
5. Bell’s second model: See [5] for details. Both of
Bell’s models supplement the quantum state space with
an additional space of ontic variables. The second model
is specialized to spin- 1
2
.
6. Aerts model: See [5] for details. As in Model 1, the
ontic state of the system is identical with its quantum
state. But there are hidden ontic variables in the mea-
surement apparatus. If their values were known, the mea-
surement would be outcome deterministic. But since they
are unknown, they must be averaged over, leading to an
effective outcome indeterministic response function.
7. Wiener-Siegel model: This model is treated in de-
tail by Belinfante [13], (the main point is on p.135). The
ontic variables are the state vector |ψ〉 and another vec-
tor |λ〉. The latter is unnormalized, and has a Gaussian
distribution over Hilbert space. Let B = {|j〉}Nj=1 be a
basis for a projective measurement. Introduce aj = 〈j|ψ〉
and bj = 〈j|λ〉. Then the response function is defined to
be ξ(i|ψ, λ,B) = 1 if the ratio |ai/bi| is the largest of the
set {|aj/bj |}, and is zero otherwise. The model is out-
come deterministic, and so must violate reciprocity (since
it cannot be maximally ψ-epistemic). That it is measure-
ment contextual can be seen by keeping the basis vector
|i〉 fixed and doing a unitary transformation on the re-
maining set {|j〉} for j 6= i. This transformation can
change the identity of the largest of the ratios {|aj/bj|}.
8Appendix B – Interpretations of the Quantum State
There is a tendancy to say that the quantum state is
either physical real or it represents knowledge. In fact the
range of options is much greater. The three dichotomies
shown in the rows of Fig. 2: individual versus ensemble,
ontic versus epistemic, and objective versus subjective,
are not equivalent. A specific interpretation will involve
FIG. 2: Relations among classes of interpretations of the
quantum state. The lines between boxes indicate overlap of
membership.
a choice of one class in each row. (For the record, my
own writings on this subject are firmly in the classes of
ensemble and objective. So far, I maintain an open mind
regarding ontic versus epistemic.)
The classes of ontic and epistemic are central to this
subject, but the meanings of those terms are not quite the
same as those in a dictionary. In the commonly used def-
initions of [1], the class ψ-epistemic includes everything
not included in ψ-ontic. That being so, we must broaden
the meaning of epistemic from its dictionary meaning,
pertaining to knowledge, to include information in gen-
eral. Since the fundamental work of Shannon, it has been
clear that information need not be subjective. In his the-
ory, a string of bits has the same information content, re-
gardless of whether it is part of anyone’s knowledge, and
regardless of whether it contains a humanly interesting
message. Therefore, I have been careful to describe epis-
temic interpretations of ψ as carrying information about
the system, rather than knowledge. The word knowl-
edge begs the question of Whose knowledge?, whereas
the word information does not.
Moving to the top row of Fig. 2, one can naturaly
regard an ensemble interpretation as epistemic. The
quantum state does not predict events, but only the prob-
abilities of events. Hence it provides information about
the system, but does not completely describe it. But
the case of ψ-ontic-supplemented also yields an ensemble
description, so an ensemble interpretation can be either
epistemic or ontic.
Similarly, an individual interpretation can be naturally
regarded as ontic, but it is at least logically possible for ψ
to give information about the individual, without itself
being an ontic element of reality. I do not know of an
actual example of such an interpretation, so I will give
an analogy. In classical thermodynamics the variables
P,V,U,S, and T are regarded as onticly real properties of
the individual system. The partition function of statisti-
cal mechanics is not regarded as ontic, but it can be used
to calculate those ontic properties. It seems logically pos-
sible for ψ to relate to the individual quantum system, in
the same way that the partition function relates to the
individual thermodynamic system.
On the bottom row of Fig. 2, it is clear that a subjective
interpretation must be epistemic. But an epistemic inter-
pretation may be either objective or subjective, depend-
ing on whether the information that its provides is objec-
tive (independent of any agent) or subjective (knowledge
possessed by some particular agent).
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